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1IDHEAP – Lausanne – November 6, 2009
Sticking one’s oar in the "all discursive"
Stphane Narath and Frdric Varone kindly proposed that I write the chapter "A 
pragmatic constructivism". I wish to thank them warmly for that. I don't know whether 
the product is acceptable, but their proposal intrigued me and I wanted to take the 
opportunity of this wonderful gathering to talk about it. I very much regret not being 
able to do so directly in your presence.
Trained in a tradition of public policy analysis dominated by so-called "cognitive" 
approaches, I have always considered that the analytical model developed by Peter 
and the team surrounding him is particularly interesting because of the pragmatic 
perspective that it affords. As I had never spoken about this to Stphane or Frdric, 
their proposal revealed their talent as mediums! They had guessed my broad 
adhesion to the model developed by Peter, whom I accompany with much interest 
and pleasure in running a public policy analysis seminar at the Institut Politiques of 
Grenoble. That is, unless Stphane and Frdric, through Peter, had perceived why I 
found it necessary to import – there where the reference frameworks approach had 
been produced and taught – a differently instrumented approach whose main merit, 
in my opinion, is that it does not stop at the threshold of public policies,.
This is the very issue that I wish to discuss here, and that I find is not considered 
adequately in the chapter proposed in the book: the difficulty of cognitive and today 
discursive approaches to say what policies actually are. Analysing an issue of this 
nature – probably as incorrect as it is pretentious – warrants long detours into the 
contexts of production and the underlying theoretical plans of the various approaches 
concerned. Some have started to do so. In particular I have in mind the highly 
interesting paper by Barbara Lucas – yet another Swiss colleague! – presented at the 
congress of the French Political Science Association last September. I will limit 
myself here to a very brief discussion of discursive approaches in public policy 
analysis, for one reason mainly.
2In more and more countries today, public policy analysis is adopting discourse 
analysis. As David Howarth and Yannis Stavrakakis have shown, political science in 
general is doing so, following other disciplines. The reasons put forward to explain 
this interest relate to the assumption (or the fact, for proponents of discourse theory) 
that the ascendancy of policy-makers (or public authorities) over the discursive field 
is essential particularly because the "resources" of policy-makers (in Peter's sense) 
are weakening. Far more than a strategic accessory in the service of actors' interests 
(as with Paul Sabatier), political discourse is considered as the main research 
subject. In recent years many studies have highlighted political language and its 
normative approach to point out the “hegemony of polity” in governance regimes, or 
the “polity's role” in the reconstruction of stabilized identities when nation states' 
capacity for integration is overwhelmed by supranational forms of trade and 
regulation. From this political and scientific context, the argumentative turn in policy 
analysis, promoted in the 1990s by authors such as Franck Fischer (but in embryonic 
form in earlier comparative work such as that of Hugh Heclo on the development of 
British and Swedish social policies), seems to be an extension of the reference 
framework approach. It focuses on the place and role of ideas in the framing of public 
issues as problems, and of possible solutions.
The pragmatic approach that Peter supports seems to be very different, most 
probably for several reasons. If this is indeed so, I would like to ask Peter to explain 
why. After reading his writings and watching him lecturing, I wish to say the following. 
Research inspired by discursive and previously cognitive approaches (that could be 
grouped under the term "argumentative approaches") tends to focus a great deal on 
the analysis of the construction of public problems and their solutions. Yet it makes
no reference to concrete public policies and shows little or no interest in their 
"impacts" and "effects". Hence, between the advocates of these argumentative 
approaches, and Peter and others (Peter has gathered a following), there is a great 
divide that is difficult to bridge – a divide between two definitions of what a public 
policy actually is.
Peter considers that a public policy is a concrete response to a given social problem, 
whereas the advocates of argumentative approaches believe that public policies are 
above all a self-realizing (or “performative”) discourse (the public policy is the 
3discourse that pronounced it). As far as I know Bruno Dente was the first to have 
perceived this tendency in the cognitive approach when he warned its French 
supporters to be careful not to "parler de ‘la politique du politique’ comme politique 
publique, avec ses acteurs, ses rseaux, etc." 1. Was Bruno, for all that, calling for an 
analysis of public policy as an action intended to transform supposedly problematical 
behaviours, that incorporates in its realization a share of political work of integration 
of contradictory interests (between "target groups" and "beneficiary groups", 
according to Peter)? I don't know and I would have liked to put the question to him.
It would spoil a festive and not only scientific occasion such as this one to talk of the 
"war of positions". But when I hear it said, in the wings, that it is a matter of 
management studies and not of policy analysis to define public policies as "a 
sequence of intentionally coherent decisions or activities, aimed at altering the 
behaviour of the social groups supposedly at the origin of the problem politically 
defined as collective", then I fear the worst!
In any case, we may well wonder whether Peter's definition of public policy does not 
seriously stick one’s oar in the “all discursive” that is unable – in the present state of 
its applications – to tell us what policies do and therefore what they are. Are policies
anything different to what they do to the society on which they act? Disavowing the 
“problem-solving” orientation, as many argumentative approaches do, changes 
nothing of the fact that policy analysis also has the objective – even if it is not the 
main one in some people's eyes – of studying "public decisions" and their "impacts" 
and "effects". Failing to acknowledge this would make policy analysis meaningless, 
for what would be the point of an analysis incapable of saying what policy-makers 
actually produce? Let's hope therefore that those convinced by argumentative 
approaches are neither flashed by a radar on the road, nor develop Alzheimer's 
disease, nor experience any other such misfortunes, so that they can carry on 
believing that the road safety policy, the Alzheimer's plan, and many other policies 
are basically just discourse!
1 DENTE B. (1995), "Incohrence ou clatement de l’Etat ?", counterpoint to the article by Bruno Jobert, in B. THERET (ed.), 
L’Etat, la finance et le social. Souverainet nationale et construction europenne. Paris, la Dcouverte, coll. "Recherches", pp. 
244-252.
4As we can see, the question is not only one of a "missing link", as Barbara Lucas 
puts it. It seems particularly complex and even serious, if we consider from this point 
what the social function of public policy analysis and its teaching ought to be.
We can now conceive that the gap can (partially) be bridged. I will conclude with a 
few comments and questions in that direction – but this time starting from how the "all 
discursive" can stick one’s oar in Peter's pragmatist approach.
Without going off into grand extrapolations on the philosophical ulterior motives of 
these two main streams of policy analysis, we can assume that the divide mentioned 
here is basically the one separating rationalism and relativism. With you, Peter, I 
wonder whether there is not a fear of relativism, which evokes both the dissolution of 
critical meaning and the collapse of scientific rigour.
From hanging around in the wings, I have the impression that the main criticism by 
the proponents of argumentative approaches, levelled at those which in their opinion 
– but not in mine, as you have seen – resemble a management study, relates to the 
well-known denunciation of objectivism and the instrumental rationality of public 
policies. As Barbara Lucas points out, Martin Rein, John Dryzek, Franck Fischer, 
John Forester and Deborah Stone, to mention but a few, have contributed to 
denouncing the image of neutrality and objectivity associated with policy analysis, 
mainly by highlighting their implicit significations and the values they convey. Dear 
Peter, is there no response to be given to this strong comment, by urging analysts to 
focus sharply, for example on the categorization of the target groups that influence 
the definition of the public problem so much? Without giving up anything 
fundamental, would it not be advantageous, on this product of a policy as on the 
others, to take more advantage of studying "policy narratives"? The application of 
your analytical model to environmental policies does not seem to be incompatible 
with the work of Maarten Hajer who, on this type of policy, has undertaken micro 
studies of processes of discussion governing the formulation of the general discourse 
on the definition of the public problem. His approach does not seem to be the goal of 
policy analysis, but rather an interesting modality for the one that you promote.
5Another remark and question. Maarten Hajer and Henk Wagenaar have spoken 
about "deliberative policy analysis". It is clear that in many countries the state is no 
longer sovereign, and analyses of "politico-administrative apparatus" attest to that. 
Hence, deliberation and the democratization of deliberation through citizens' 
participation (as "beneficiaries" and, why not, "target groups") in the expertise 
concerning them is, for some (Hajer and Wagenaar; Dryzek; Fischer; Papadopoulos; 
etc.), precisely a major solution (or "resource"). Now, in the list of resources that 
incorporate your model, there are two ("political support" and "consensus") that leave 
room for deliberation and, through them, for fundamentally argumentative processes. 
Of course that has not eluded you, but do those who apply your model take the time 
to analyse how, right down to discursive processes, these resources effectively act? 
Clearly, questions of method and of the required empirical work spare none of our 
approaches.
But you're certainly not someone that I'll criticize for not telling us to work, work and 
work even more. For by working on the empirical development of the respective 
reference frameworks, the gap between them might just be narrowed down a little.
Philippe Warin, CNRS, Pacte/IEP Grenoble. 
